SOC vs SOC 2 Explained: What Is the Difference?

SOC and SOC 2 sound as though they belong to the same cybersecurity framework, but the similarity is largely accidental.

A Security Operations Centre, normally shortened to SOC, is an operational security function. Its purpose is to monitor an organisation’s environment, detect suspicious behaviour, investigate threats and coordinate the response to security incidents.

SOC 2 has a completely different meaning. It belongs to the AICPA’s System and Organisation Controls reporting framework and is an attestation examination concerned with controls relevant to the Trust Services Criteria. Those criteria cover security, availability, processing integrity, confidentiality and privacy.

The simplest distinction is therefore that a SOC is concerned with security operations, while SOC 2 is concerned with independent assurance over a defined system and its controls.

An organisation can operate an excellent Security Operations Centre without having a SOC 2 report. Equally, a service organisation can obtain a SOC 2 report without operating a traditional internal Security Operations Centre.

Understanding that distinction prevents a surprising amount of confusion during security reviews, supplier assessments and procurement exercises.

Within cybersecurity operations, SOC usually means Security Operations Centre.

A SOC provides the people, processes and technologies required to monitor an organisation’s security environment and respond when suspicious activity is identified. Depending on the organisation and operating model, telemetry may be collected from endpoints, identity platforms, cloud infrastructure, network devices, Microsoft 365, firewalls, email security systems and business applications.

Modern SOC environments commonly use technologies such as Security Information and Event Management, Endpoint Detection and Response, Extended Detection and Response and Security Orchestration, Automation and Response.

Collecting telemetry is only one part of the function. A mature SOC also requires detection engineering, alert triage, investigation, threat intelligence, escalation procedures, incident response and continual improvement.

An alert indicating impossible travel on a user account, for example, is not automatically an incident. Analysts need to correlate identity telemetry with endpoint behaviour, authentication records, device information and other available evidence before deciding whether the activity is legitimate, suspicious or malicious.

The effectiveness of a SOC therefore depends on considerably more than the security platform displaying the alerts. Detection quality, telemetry coverage, analyst capability, response procedures and the time taken to investigate meaningful events are all critical.

SOC 2 is part of the AICPA’s System and Organisation Controls suite of reporting services.

A SOC 2 examination evaluates controls within a service organisation’s defined system against the applicable Trust Services Criteria. The resulting report is designed to provide customers, business partners, auditors and other specified users with assurance about how the organisation manages relevant risks.

SOC 2 should not be confused with a cybersecurity certification. The organisation does not simply complete a checklist and receive a certificate declaring that is SOC 2 compliant.

Instead, management describes the system being examined, identifies the applicable Trust Services Criteria and makes assertions about the controls in place. An independent licensed CPA or equivalent practitioner then performs an examination and issues an attestation report.

The distinction matters because the scope and design of the system are fundamental to understanding what a SOC 2 report actually tells you.

The Trust Services Criteria are organised around five categories: Security, Availability, Processing Integrity, Confidentiality and Privacy.

Security addresses protection of information and systems against unauthorised access, unauthorised disclosure and damage that could compromise the organisation’s ability to meet its objectives.

Availability considers whether information and systems are available for operation and use in accordance with the organisation’s commitments and system requirements.

Processing Integrity addresses whether system processing is complete, valid, accurate, timely and authorised in order to meet the organisation’s objectives.

Confidentiality considers whether information designated as confidential is appropriately protected.

Privacy relates to the collection, use, retention, disclosure and disposal of personal information in accordance with the organisation’s commitments and applicable criteria.

Not every SOC 2 examination necessarily covers all five categories. Scope should reflect the service being provided, the risks involved and the commitments the service organisation makes to its customers.

The scope is therefore one of the first things an IT or security professional should examine when reviewing a supplier’s SOC 2 report. Simply being told that a supplier has SOC 2 does not explain which systems, services or Trust Services Criteria were included.

The distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 is particularly important during third party risk assessments.

A SOC 2 Type 1 report addresses the design of controls at a specified date. It provides assurance about whether the system is fairly described and whether the controls were suitably designed to meet the applicable Trust Services Criteria at that point in time.

A SOC 2 Type 2 report goes further by also examining whether the relevant controls operated effectively throughout a specified period.

For technical and procurement teams assessing a mature service provider, a Type 2 report will therefore usually provide stronger evidence because it addresses operating effectiveness over time rather than control design at one date.

The difference can be illustrated with privileged access reviews. A Type 1 examination might establish that the organisation has designed a control requiring privileged accounts to be reviewed periodically. A Type 2 examination can include evidence showing whether those reviews actually took place consistently during the examination period and whether identified exceptions were handled appropriately.

Neither report should simply be accepted at face value. The auditor’s opinion, examination period, control exceptions, management responses, complementary user entity controls and system boundaries all deserve careful review.

SOC 2 and ISO 27001 overlap in several areas, but they are not interchangeable.

ISO 27001 is an international standard for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually improving an Information Security Management System. Certification is performed by an accredited certification body against the requirements of the standard.

SOC 2 is an attestation reporting framework rather than an ISO management system certification. It evaluates a defined service organisation system and its controls against applicable Trust Services Criteria, with the examination performed by an appropriately licensed independent practitioner.

Organisations with established ISO 27001 environments may have already have many controls that support a SOC 2 examination, particularly around access control, risk management, incident management, supplier management, change control and security governance. The evidence requirements, system description, scoping and reporting model are nevertheless different.

For organisations serving both European and North American customers, maintaining ISO 27001 certification alongside a SOC 2 Type 2 report is increasingly common because customers may request different forms of assurance during procurement third-party risk reviews.

SOC 1, SOC 2 and SOC 3 are separate reporting services and should not be treated as increasing levels of the same framework.

SOC 1 focuses on controls at a service organisation that are relevant to user entities’ internal control over financial reporting. Payroll processors, payment related services and other providers whose activities can affect customers’ financial reporting are common examples of environments where SOC 1 may be relevant.

SOC 2 addresses controls using the Trust Services Criteria and is therefore commonly encountered when assessing technology, cloud, SaaS, hosting and managed service providers.

SOC 3 also addresses the Trust Services Criteria, but the report contains considerably less detail and is intended for general use. Unlike the detailed SOC 2 report, a SOC 3 report can be distributed freely and may therefore be published publicly by a service provider.

For technical due diligence, the detailed SOC 2 report is generally much more useful because reviewers need to understand the system boundary, controls, testing and any exceptions identified during the examination.

A Security Operations Centre can support a number of controls relevant to a SOC 2 environment, particularly around security monitoring, threat detection, incident management and response.

For example, a SOC may provide evidence of centralised logging, alert monitoring, investigation workflows, incident tickets, escalation procedures and security event retention. Detection and response capabilities can also demonstrate that the organisation has processes for identifying and acting upon security events.

Operating a SOC does not, however, make an organisation SOC 2 compliant or guarantee a successful SOC 2 examination.

SOC 2 extends well beyond operational threat monitoring. Depending on scope, auditors may examine logical and physical access controls, change management, risk assessment, vendor management, system operations, vulnerability management, incident response, governance, business continuity and other relevant control activities.

The relationship is therefore one of contribution rather than equivalence. A mature Security Operations Centre can provide important technical controls and evidence within a SOC 2 programme, but it represents only part of the wider control environment.

No assurance report should be interpreted as proof that an organisation cannot suffer a cyber attack.

SOC 2 provides independent assurance over the system, controls, criteria and period described within the report. Its value comes from giving customers and other specified users detailed information that can support their own risk assessment.

A technically competent review should therefore go beyond confirming that the report exists.

Check whether the service you consume falls inside the system boundary. Review which Trust Services Criteria were included. Understand the examination period and whether the report is Type 1 or Type 2. Read the auditor’s opinion carefully and examine any testing exceptions.

Complementary User Entity Controls are particularly important. These identify controls that the service organisation assumes its customers will operate themselves. A supplier’s controls may therefore depend on your organisation configuring identities, permissions, integrations or other security settings correctly.

Where subcontractors or cloud providers form part of the service delivery chain, reviewers should also understand how subservice organisations are treated within the report.

A SOC 2 report is valuable assurance evidence, but it does not remove the need for technical due diligence.

The first step should be to confirm that the report actually covers the service being purchased. Supplier groups can operate multiple products, hosting environments and legal entities, and the presence of a SOC 2 report somewhere within the organisation does not automatically mean your service is within scope.

The reporting period should then be checked for relevance. Where a gap exists between the end of the Type 2 examination period and the current date, customers may request a bridge letter describing significant changes since the report period, although the evidential value of a bridge letter is different from an independent examination.

Technical reviewers should pay particular attention to exceptions identified during control testing. An exception is not automatically evidence of poor security, but its nature, frequency, root causes and remediation can reveal considerably more than a simple SOC 2 badge.

Complementary User Entity Controls should also be mapped against your own environment to confirm that assumptions made by the service provider are actually being satisfied.

For higher risk suppliers, SOC 2 should form one component of the assessment alongside architecture reviews, data flow analysis, penetration testing evidence, vulnerability management, incident response capabilities, data residency, recovery objectives and contractual security requirements.

SOC and SOC 2 address different security problems.

A Security Operations Centre provides an operational capability designed to detect, investigate and respond to threats as they occur. SOC 2 provides structured independent assurance about whether controls within a defined service organisation system have been appropriately designed and, for Type 2 reports, whether relevant controls operated effectively during the examination period.

One deals primarily with operational security.

The other deals primarily with assurance.

Strong security programmes frequently need both perspectives. Technical controls need to operate effectively in the real world, while customers, auditors and stakeholders increasingly expect credible evidence that appropriate controls exist and are being operated consistently.

Understanding the difference also helps IT teams ask better questions. Instead of asking whether a supplier is SOC compliant, determine what form of SOC report they hold, what services are included, which criteria were examined, whether the report is Type 1 or Type 2, what exceptions were identified and how the supplier detects and responds to threats operationally.

Those questions provide considerably more insight than either acronym on its own.